Muslim responses to the Crusades have been a focus of modern scholarship in both Crusades studies and medieval Islamic history over the last decade or so. This important aspect of the Crusades had been largely, if not entirely, ignored by Western scholars owing to their particular Western academic environment. One of the common misconceptions about the Muslim understanding of and response to the Crusaders is the view that the Muslims knew little, if anything, about them and were confused about the difference between the Byzantines and the Franks (Crusaders). Consequently, it took the Muslims approximately a half century to organize a unified Muslim front to fight against the Crusaders. Despite this view, Muslim sources reveal that Muslim intellectuals and religious figures closely observed the Crusaders' actions and motives, and they did, in various ways, respond to this hitherto unimagined flood of people from the West. This paper a ttem pts to high ligh t and explore the Muslim ideological, religious, military, and diplomatic responses to the Crusaders.
Introduction
What happened when the Islamic world was being invaded by an external enemy, the Latins (Crusaders), near the end of the eleventh century? Were the Muslims so preoccupied and obsessed with their internal problems that they did not think to resist the invaders? The answer would be no! Muslims responded to this wave of Christians. First and foremost, Muslim religious and intellectual elites and those who had a direct confrontation with the Franks, as in the case of Anatolia, resisted to the best of their ability. Carole Hillenbrand, in her groundbreaking The Crusades: Islamic Perspective, concedes that "it would be wrong to assume that there were no stirrings of jihād feelings" 1 a m o n g t h e M u s l i m s e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e F r a n k s t o o k Jerusalem in 1099. The Muslim calls to military jihād even predate the fall of Jerusalem; quoting Ibn al-Jawzī's record for the year 1097-1098, Hillenbrand writes, "There were many calls to go out and fight against the Franks and complaints multiplied in every place." 2 However, it is wrong to assume that Muslims were completely indifferent to practicing the doctrine of jihād and did not resist the Frankish invasion from the beginning. To make things much easier to understand, we would like to divide the Muslim response into three broad categories: the ideological/intellectual/religious, the military, and the diplomatic.
The Ideological/Intellectual/Religious Response
The fall of Jerusalem was a disastrous event recorded with great sadness and pain. Al-Masjid al-aqṣā and the Dome of the Rock have always been a glorious sight and potent symbol of the Islamic faith. The Frankish occupation of Jerusalem, which housed both of those buildings, was an act of grave desecration in Muslim eyes. Moreover, symbols of pollution and purity abound in the Muslim portrayal of the Franks. Muslims often recalled, "If Mecca was the body of faith, then Medina was one wing and Jerusalem was the other." Therefore, the implication was clear, writes Michael Foss, that "For the progress of the whole faith both wings were needed. After the fall of Jerusalem, there was an expectation within Islam that the disaster This is an indication of the fact that even after the capture of and massacre in Jerusalem by the Franks, Muslim intellectuals continued to arouse the spirit of jihād among the people. This is evident in the production of a number of genres, particularly jihād (including poetry) and faḍāʾil (merits) literature, which attained special attention and attraction but have often been ignored by contemporary historians 7 of the Crusades. This literature does provide us a vivid and wider picture of the Muslim interpretation of and response to the Crusades in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 8
Al-Sulamī's Response to Crusades (Muslim Reformation and Jihād Literature)
As we have observed, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Ṭāhir al-Sulamī (1039/1040-1106) was probably the first Muslim intellectual and jurist who had a broader understanding and was aware of the goals of the Frankish incursion into Muslim lands; he was the first who rose to call Muslims to action, much as the Caliph did, to fight the enemy and to Dare you slumber in the blessed shade of safety, where life is as soft as an orchard flower? Must the foreigners feed on our ignominy, while you trail behind you the train of a pleasant life, like men whose world is at peace? When the white swords' points are red with blood, and the iron of the brown lances is stained with gore! This is war, and the man who shuns the whirlpool to save his life shall grind his teeth in penitence. This is war, and the infidel's sword is naked in his hand, ready to be sheathed again in men's necks and skulls. See defend the Muslims and their territories against the foreign onslaught of the Franks. Al-Sulamī, just a few years after the fall of Jerusalem to the Franks, took to the pulpit in the Masjid of Bayt Lihya in the ghūṭa area on the outskirts of Damascus to preach jihād. In this way, over the course of the year 1105, he publicly dictated a treatise entitled Kitāb al-jihād (Book of jihād), which continued to be read in Damascus after his death in 1106. 9 He was preaching and reviving the spirit of jihād in a myriad of new contexts among the followers of Islam as they were experiencing, for the first time, a new situation in which their lands were being attacked by an external, non-Muslim enemy; it was quite a different context from that of earlier Muslims who used to fight in the territory of non-Muslim enemies. Al-Sulamī in particular preached during a period of extreme urgency and deep crisis: The Crusades.
In his Kitāb al-jihād, al-Sulamī perceived the First Crusade within a divine framework, describing it as one of the greatest disasters that had befallen Islam and as an admonition from God to the Muslims that tested their dedication to Him and their obedience by following the true message of Islam, which included the jihād. Al-Sulamī argues that the obligation of jihād was smoothly and continuously established and practiced from the time of the Prophet Muḥammad through to a certain (unnamed) caliph, he writes:
After (the death of) the Prophet [Muḥammad] (God bless him) the four caliphs and all the Companions (of the Prophet) [enthusiastically practiced] it [jihād] during his caliphate, and those who were appointed as successors afterwards and ruled in their own time, one after another, followed them in that, the ruler carrying out an expedition himself every year, or sending someone out from his deputies on his behalf. It did not cease to be that way until the time in which one of the caliphs (unnamed in the text) left off (doing) it because of his weakness and negligence. Others followed him in this for the reason mentioned, or a similar one. His stopping this ... made it necessary that God dispersed their unity, split up their togetherness, 9 For a brief biography of al-Sulamī, see David Thomas and Alex Mallet (eds.), Christian-Muslim Relations: A Bibliographical History, 1050 -1200 (Leiden: Brill, 2011 , III, 307-308; also more details about his book (Kitāb al-jihād) and preaching the jihād can be found in Suleiman A. Mourad and James E. Lindsay (eds.), The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 33-36. threw enmity and hatred between them, and tempted their enemies to snatch their country from their grasp and (so) cure their hearts of them. 10 Al-Sulamī believed that once the Muslims were ready to abide by God's commands, He would help them against the enemy. As such, the attack of Franks into Islamic territory was but a punishment of God for not executing and upholding the jihād. How should the Muslims now confront the ruthless Crusaders (Franks) who had already taken Jerusalem and other major portions of the Levant? According to al-Sulamī, writing in such a distinct situation would affect how Muslims would construe the obligation to struggle for justice. Al-Sulamī, citing the famous legalist al-Shāfiʿī (d. 206/820), notes that the imām (the leader of the Muslim community, or the Caliph) was responsible for raising an army to undertake expeditions into enemy territory at least once a year. 11 The minimum responsibility placed on an imām was to lead the army either personally or through a deputy. If he did not send enough troops to fight, then it became the duty of those "in the rear" to go out and fulfill God's command; in the case of urgency or necessity, the obligation of fighting (ghazwa) was incumbent (farḍ ʿayn) upon all the members of the community. 12 The current situation, al-Sulamī believed, was one such instance because enemy armies were making inroads into Muslim territory. Dajani-Shakeel, however, observes, "the twelfth-century interpretation of the doctrine of jihād [as the treatise of al-Sulamī] departed, to some extent, from the classical interpretation of the doctrine, due to circumstantial differences as well as to the nature of the enemy." 13 Al-Sulamī further cites the views of the twelfth century's greatest theologian and philosopher, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), on the jihād. According to al-Ghazālī, jihād was a duty of every free, able Muslim, and its aim 10 Niall Christie, The Book of the Jihad of ʿAli ibn Tahir al-Sulami (d. 1106): Text, Translation and Commentary (Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2015) , 206 (hereafter referred as Book of the Jihad).
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The aim of such yearly undertaking was to defend Muslim territory and gather intelligence information about any military movements of the enemy. was to try "to exalt the word of God (who is praised), to demonstrate his religion, to suppress by it his enemies the polytheists, to achieve the reward which God (who is praised) and His Prophet promised him from (fighting) the jihād i n H i s c a u s e . " H e m a k e s c l e a r , according to Christie, that the jihād, however, is an obligation of sufficiency; as al-Ghazālī puts it:
If the group which was facing the enemy had enough people in it, then it would be possible for them (the group) to fight hard against them (the enemy) (by) themselves, and to remove their evil separately from others. Yet if the group was weak, and was not able to be sufficient (to face) the enemy and to defeat their evil, then the obligation (to help) is imposed on the people of the nearby countries. 14 Al-Ghazālī was certain to mention, Christie further observes, that the jihād was defensive in nature in terms of the Muslim response to the First Crusade. Taking al-Shām (Syria) as an example, al-Ghazālī says:
If the enemy attacks one of its [Syrian Muslim] cities, and there are not enough people in it to fight and defeat them, it is obligatory on all the cities belonging to Syria to send people to it to fight until there are sufficient (people). At that time the obligation falls from the others because the lands of Syria are like one town. If those who are able from them come to fight the enemy and not enough undertake (the fighting of) them, coming to fight them and joining battle with them is also obligatory for those who are near Syria, until there are enough. At that time the obligation also falls from the others. If the enemy surrounds one town, the obligation of the jihād likewise becomes incumbent on all who are there, whatever befalls its location. 15 Dajani-Shakeel argues that al-Sulamī, worried by the advance of the early Crusaders in Syria, was more moving than al-Ghazālī in defining the jihād because he was trying to inspire enthusiasm among the Damascenes. He was preaching to them amidst the danger of their city's fall to the Crusaders and was trying to rouse them to action. Therefore, al-Sulamī notes that all the instructions mentioned by the early jurists' in regard to the jihād and its rules and regulations actually aimed at: 14 Christie, Book of the Jihad, 208. 15 
Ibid.
Carrying it (jihād) into enemy territory, be they near or far. However, if the enemy raids Muslim lands and attacks their country, such as these forsaken (the Crusaders) did, then we are obliged to go to fight them and seek them out in the country that they usurped from the Muslims, which is a war of resistance, aimed at defending ourselves, children, and property, and at safeguarding lands that are still under Muslim control. 16 With a different interpretation from the earlier juristic views, he further adds, "Had it not been for the purpose of uprooting them (the Crusaders), and recovering the territories, then, marching against them, in such a situation, could neither be labeled as jihād nor as ghazwa (expedition)." 17 For this reason, he again reiterates that jihād is obligatory "on each person who is able, with no impediment of blindness, serious illness or excessive age, which makes it impossible to move, to prevent him from it [jihād] ." 18 Al-Sulamī's call for jihād as a defensive matter was not only trying to boost and arouse morale among the ordinary people but also trying to mobilize the rulers of the Muslims (the Sultan or the Caliph in Baghdad) because they were more responsible for upholding and continuing the jihād. He called upon the sultan to act immediately in what God had made "a duty to him of guarding the religion [Islam], guiding the Muslims and defense of himself, his army and them (the Muslims)." 19 Admonishing him (the Sultan), he says: "if the authorities do not pay any heed to the duty, then they should remember the Prophet Muḥammad's saying, 'Whoever looks after a group of subjects, and does not give them good advice [naṣīḥa], God has forbidden him Paradise'." Further explaining the term advice (naṣīḥa), al-Sulamī says that it also means, "watching over his subjects, protecting them and driving the harmful enemies from them." Supporting and extending his argument with additional sharīʿa references, he quotes another ḥadīth, which says, "All of you are guardians, and all of you are responsible for His subjects." 20 16 Ibid, 233; see also Dajani-Shakeel, "Perceptions of the Counter-Crusade," 53-54. 17 Christie, Book of the Jihad, 233. Al-Sulamī declared that the key to jihād, which is a religious duty, lies in the greater jihād (al-jihād al-akbar): resisting and fighting the evil impulses of the soul and following the ethical code of Islam. This, considered by many Muslims as the real jihād, is a spiritual jihād. He called upon the Muslim Caliph and all other rulers of al-Shām, al-Jazīra, and Egypt to shun their ideological differences and to unite at this critical time (i.e., the Crusades). In addition, al-Sulamī reiterated, "in severity, hatreds go", for he recounted that even early Arab adversaries used to unite in times of crisis or against a universal enemy, and when the crisis ended, they would either remain as allies or divide again as they had been before. Thus, he preached that Muslims should follow the example of their predecessors and foster amiable and friendly relationships with each other in a critical situation such as the Crusades. 21 It is important to remember that al-Sulamī was preaching at the time of an almost complete power vacuum in the Muslim world. As Dajani-Shakeel wrote, "there were leaders who lacked both the moral qualities and the will to fight against the invaders." 22 Therefore, al-Sulamī tried to remedy this vacuum through two important developments: first, the mobilization of fighting scholars and intellectuals; and second, the rise to power of ghāzī-caliphs, or rather, in these circumstances, ghāzī-sultans who would be stirred by the pain of the Muslim community. His treatise on jihād, surprisingly, traced the broad outline of what actually happened subsequently. This helped to develop the long process of what later came to be known as the Counter-Crusade (a misnomer). 23 As for the first remedy, al-Sulamī did help to mobilize religious scholars and he himself emerged from the political chaos just after the First Crusade actually taking up arms against the Crusaders. 24 Counting the role of these fighting scholars, Michael Bonner in his Jihād in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice, a d d s , " F r o m a strictly military point of view, their contribution may have been negligible, but from a broader political point of view, it mattered considerably. In particular, legal and religious scholars had a visible role in the first major Muslim victory over the Crusaders at Balat in 1119." 25 During the second mobilization, ghāzī-sultans took longer to come forward and to reconstitute their own forces, but as we know, this issue eventually dominated the Muslim political scene. The leadership vacuum that had been created was later filled primarily by three charismatic leaders of jihād: ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī (d. 541/1146), his son Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd Zangī (d. 570/1174) and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (d. 589/1193). They each contributed to the task (the military response, as will be explored and explained shortly) that ultimately liberated the whole Levant from the Crusaders. 26 They revived the spirit of jihād and unity among the Muslims.
In defense of the Islamic heartlands and to continue to inspire among Muslims the spirit of fulfillment of God's duty, new works on the jihād, such as al-Sulamī's, were recited on public occasions, together with older ones, such as the Book of jihād (a work of ḥadīth) by the Iranian ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak (d. 181/797). 27 However, this was only one aspect of the works of jihādthose devoted to the theoretical aspects of its doctrine, says Atiya. The other aspect, he adds, is even more extensively examined by writers. He remarks:
In fact, a whole literature arose to deal with the practical issues of the Eastern art of war, more particularly in the later Middle Ages. Treatises on equestrian art and chivalry, on armor and the proper manipulation of each weapon, the technique of fighting, tactics, and the order of battle were compiled by warriors and generals of proven experience and accurate knowledge of military science. The vast output of M u s l i m w r i t e r s i n t h i s i m p o r t a n t f i e l d m o r e t h a n j u s t i f i e s a monumental study on the history of the Eastern art of war... 28 Equally important was the emergence of a particular genre of literature -faḍāʾil (merits or eulogies or in-praise) literature; new books on particular cities, including Mecca, Medina, Damascus, and Jerusalem, were passionately written by Muslim scholars and preachers symbolizing the importance and status of these cities in Islam. Above all, Jerusalem received particular attention with a large number of books and treatises flourishing during the Crusade period. Jerusalem is the third holiest site in Islam, after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and though it enjoyed an important place in Islam through its history, it attained symbolic importance for the Muslim campaign partly in response to the Crusaders' searing passion for that city, which they invaded and captured during the first Crusades in 1099. The faḍāʾil al-Quds (eulogies of Jerusalem) literature also characterizes the intellectual response to the Crusades and needs to be explored. As for al-Aqṣā Masjid, al-ḥarām refers to the whole area inside the walls, including the main building of the Masjid, the marwānī muṣallā (muṣallā is a small prayer place, smaller than, or a part of, a masjid), the Dome of the Rock seems appropriate to examine the status of Jerusalem as envisioned in Islamic traditions before we proceed and discuss the faḍāʾil literature.
Faḍāʾil al-Quds Literature
In the Qurʾān, the land of Jerusalem/Palestine is mentioned as "alarḍ al-muqaddasa" 30 or "the sanctified land" and all of Syria is generally believed to be the blessed land. 31 Jerusalem's importance in general and al-Masjid al-aqṣā's (the Farthest Masjid) in particular to the Muslims is obvious from the fact that the name of the Masjid itself is indicated in the seventeenth sūra (chapter) of the Qurʾān. According to the Qurʾānic reference, the Prophet Muḥammad was taken on a miraculous Night Journey from Mecca to the place (in Jerusalem) called al-Masjid al-Aqṣā; the Qurʾān says: "Glory be to him Who carried His Servant (Muḥammad by night, from the sacred place of prayer (al-Masjid al-ḥarām) to the farthest place of prayer (al-Masjid al-Aqṣā) , The precincts of which We have blessed, that We might show him some of Our signs. He is the All-Hearing, the All-Seeing." 32 The Prophetic tradition further explains and continues al-isrāʾ "the Night Journey" verse by reporting that it is from this Masjid that the Prophet Muḥammad, who was riding on a heavenly creature (a white animal) called al-Burāq to the Farthest Masjid, ascended to heaven (al-miʿrāj). 33 Since then, Muslims have called the city "the gate to the heavens." In this journey, it is reported that the Prophet Muḥammad led all the prophets in a nightly congregation prayer in Bayt al maqdis. 34 Moreover, a number of prophetic traditions further (Qubbat al-ṣakhra) and the grounds that connect all of them inside the walls. The whole area of the masjid is 14 hectares, about 15 percent of the area of the Old City (the Old City's area is 1 square kilometer). The main building of al-Aqṣā Masjid rests on the southern part of al-Ḥaram al-sharīf and its interior is 75 meters long and 55 meters wide. It has no minaret but a dome in the center of the ceiling covered by silver. His Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq (History of Damascus City), 42 published in eighty volumes, extensively addressed the history, geography, and society of Damascus. He was also said to have written a treatise on jihād. 43 We also have another work, Faḍāʾil al-Quds al-sharīf by Ibn al-Jawzī (d. 597/1201); and it also contains traditions about Jerusalem and the "holy land" (al arḍ al muqaddas), its foundational ṣakhra ("rock") and, among other things, its association with the Prophet Muḥammad during his miʿrāj.
The production of faḍāʾil literature obviously could have enhanced the desire on the part of Muslims to reconquer Jerusalem. Equally important is that Ibn ʿAsākir's work glorifying Jerusalem was read publicly to large audiences in Damascus from the AD 1160s, onwards. Consequently, such mass gatherings and preaching could have reawakened and strengthened the sanctity of Jerusalem in the popular consciousness and built up the expectation that the Holy city would be recaptured. 44 Although the Crusades added a new dimension to the significance of Jerusalem, it was the great sanctity and status that the city enjoyed long before the Crusades, as we mentioned, that made it the symbol of the jihād against the Franks. 45 Aziz S. Atiya has aptly remarked, "the Muslim was bound by his religion not only to visit those places but also to preserve them within the pale of the Islamic Empire and defend them against the Crusader." 46 One should, however, note that all of the Jerusalem "Praise-in-Literature" did not aspire to make it a pilgrimage destination in rivalry with Mecca. Rather all the particular genresjihād, including jihād poetry, faḍāʾil al-Qudsintended to revive the spirit of jihād among the Muslims who were confounded by internal discord; indeed, it helped to foster Muslim unity, a prerequisite to fight their common enemy; however, it took a longtime to organize a 44 Ibid., 164-165. 45 Western historians often contend, out of their stereotypical, inimical and biased approach toward Islamic texts, that after the fall of Jerusalem to the Franks, Muslim jurists and religious scholars engendered and orchestrated on their own, with no reference to Islam, the status of Jerusalem, which they then exploited to the fullest possible extent in a propaganda campaign to garner support for their personal political ambitions, if not for the real jihād. On the contrary, as we have pointed out, Jerusalem enjoys a special place in Islam and will continue to do so; it was not just for mere political reasons that Muslim rulers strongly yearned to recapture of Jerusalem, and they did so out of their religious conviction. Equally important is that they were fighting the real enemy, the Crusaders. Western scholars' bewilderment is that they often see the Muslim world through a Western perception even after they have great expertise in the Arabic language; for more details, see for example, Elad, Medieval Jerusalem, especially 1-50; Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspective, 141-167. 46 Atiya, Crusade, Commerce, and Culture, 133. strong unified resistance until Nūr al-Dīn came to the scene. In fact, his father ʿImād al-Dīn took the initiative in the truest sense, which later his son astutely imitated, followed by the great Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn of Ayyūbid dynasty who actually did help Muslim to realize the success.
Military Response to the Crusades
The Muslim military response to the Crusades, as we have already mentioned, was not unified or organized at first. It took time for Muslim intellectuals and rulers to convert the theory of jihād into practice following the continuous calls for jihād against the Franks, which reverberated everywhere.
Nevertheless, the first physical encounter that took place between t h e S e l j u k s u l t a n o f R ū m , Q i l i j A r s l ā n I ( r . 1 0 9 2 -1 1 0 7 ) a n d t h e Crusaders occurred when the first wave of the First Crusade (the People's or peasants' Crusade) tried to intrude into the Seljuk territory in the autumn of 1096. However, the people's Crusade totally failed to advance and a majority of them were killed. However, after this initial Muslim success, Crusaders managed to sweep across Asia Minor until they succeeded in establishing the four major Crusader-States in the Levant, including Jerusalem. Muslims were struck with shock and outrage, and poets and preachers reiterated calls to both the local rulers in the Levant and the Great Seljuk sultan in the east for jihād and aid in defending the Muslim lands against the Frankish invasion. Thus, after the fall of Tripoli in 1109 to the Franks, the Great Seljuk sultan Muḥammad (r. 1105-18) moved to act and launched a number of expeditions against the Franks, but again internal discord became a hurdle. Like the Fāṭimids of Egypt, the local rulers of the Levant had made alliances with the Franks, and thus the sultan had to abandon the expedition without any major success. 47 Despite the failures, the spirit of jihād remained alive; there was a strong local reaction amongst religious scholars, but it had yet to be harnessed into a full-scale military campaign because it was not backed up by the rulers or political authorities in a concerted fashion. It is believed that the first major turning point in Muslim success and the subsequent reawakening of an organized jihād came with the fall of Edessa in 539/1144. However, the wave was already beginning to turn in the preceding decades; slowly and gradually, the isolated jihād campaigns had already begun. 48 The first tentative turning-point for the Muslims was in the year 1119 when the Turkmen ruler of the Mardin, Ilghāzī (r. 1108-1122), was asked by the citizens of Aleppo, who had sought military help from Baghdad, to take control of their city and defend it against Roger of Antioch. Ilghāzī took over and tried to be an ideal leader of jihād. He went on to win the first victory of the Muslim response (or the Counter-Crusade as Western scholars call it) at the battle at Balat; he defeated and killed Roger of Salerno, the regent of Antioch (r. 1113-1119). The Frankish loss and the destruction were so severe that the battle came to be called the Field of Blood. It is reported that a famous Muslim religious figure, al-Qāḍī Abū l-Faḍl ibn al-Khashshāb of Aleppo, was closely involved in running the affairs of Aleppo and took part in the battle of Balat himself. Ilghāzī, however, could not capitalize on his success because he died in 1122, leaving the Aleppans disappointed, if not frightened. 49 Ilghāzī's nephew, Nūr al-Dawla Balak, also became engaged with the jihād against the Franks. It is said that he displayed tremendous vigor in a number of encounters against them, and he is extolled as a Muslim champion in the wars against the Crusaders; but he was killed outside Manbij in 518/1124 and was buried in Aleppo. 50 The political vacuum created was immediately filled by the Zangī dynasty. It was under the leadership of ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī, who became the governor (atābeg) of Mosul in 1127 and Aleppo in 1128, that the first organized Islamic military response began to emerge, comprising both religious and political figures in their first key victory against the Franks with the fall of Edessa (al-Ruhā) in 1144. With this victory, the good fortune of the Muslim world in its jihād campaign against the Franks boosted the spirit of jihād and raised their morale; they now began to look toward the conquest of Jerusalem, but it was never accomplished in his lifetime. 48 Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspective, 108. It was in this atmosphere of turmoil, intimidation, and extreme humiliation of the Muslims that fortune favored the community of monotheists (al-ḥanīfiyya) and helped them out of their precarious condition by supporting the believers in their struggle and bringing forth ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī as their leader. Ibn al-Athīr eulogized the Zangī for this great achievement (the capture of Edessa) and for reviving Islamic values (jihād and unity); he expresses the achievements of ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī in a panegyrical passage:
When Almighty God saw the princes of the Islamic lands and the commanders of the Hanafite creed and how unable they were to support the [true] religion and their inability to defend those who believe in the One God and He saw their subjugation by their enemy and the severity of their despotism ... He then wished to set over the Franks someone who could requite the evil of their deeds and to send to the devils of the crosses stones from Him to destroy and annihilate them [the crosses]. He looked at the roster of valiants among His helpers and of those possessed of judgment, support and sagacity amongst His friends and He did not see in it (the roster) anyone more capable of that command, more solid as regards inclination, stronger of purpose and more penetrating than the lord, the martyr (al-shahīd) ʿImād al-Dīn [Zangī] . 51 ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī became famous in the Muslim world for his brilliant leadership qualities and his military and political skills. He was even more remembered as a true mujāhid (the one who carries out jihād), "The adornment of Islam, the king helped by God, the helper of the believers" against the Franks, is thus portrayed as a real hero of Islam. In fact, it was only after the recapture of Edessa that Muslims' call for jihād began to receive momentum and that he reunited the Northern Syria. Two of the famous poets of the time, Ibn al-Qaysarānī and Ibn Munīr, as Hillenbrand wrote, "eloquently urged Zangī ... to make the reconquest of the entire Syrian coastline (the sāḥil) the principal aim of jihad." 52 Zangī is also reported to have patronized and sponsored the foundation of many religious seminaries -madrasas and khanqāhs -as "part of a broader movement of moral rearmament, in which both rulers and the religious élite devoted themselves to stamping out corruption and heterodoxy in the Muslim community, as part of a grand jihād which had much wider aims than merely the removal of the Franks from the coastline of Palestine." 53 However, before he could move to gain more territories, particularly Damascus, from Frankish possession, ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī died in 1146, just two years after his victory over Edessa. Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Zangī ibn Āqsunqūr, ruler of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, died of a heart attack on Wednesday 11 shawwāl 569/15 May 1174 and was buried in the citadel at Damascus but was later transferred to the madrasa that he had founded near the Osier-workers' market (sūq al-khawāsīn) in Damascus. 63 Nūr al-Dīn, a s a mujāhid, earned his reputation as the liberator of Muslim territories, especially Syria, from the Franks, which also led toward the reunification of Syria and Egypt. His admirers often speak of his high morals, piousness, stature as a true Sunnī Muslim and theologian, and rather zealous embrace of jihād against the Franks. which God has lifted His Messenger to the Heavens." 70 However, he soon became the independent ruler of Egypt but was still a lieutenant of Nūr al-Dīn, and in favor and "recognition of the ʿAbbāsid Caliph as the highest spiritual authority, and as the only symbol of Islamic unity," there emerged many rebellions/plots against him because the ousted Fāṭimids resented him as a foreigner and a usurper of their rights. 71 In Syria, after the death of Nūr al-Dīn in 1174, the situation worsened. The death of a ruler always led to a succession struggle, and this was coupled with attacks from the Crusaders. There were, however, uneasy relations between Nūr al-Dīn and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn after 1171 when Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn become the ruler of Egypt. However, things changed quickly after Nūr al-Dīn's death in 1174; the situation was so grave that some scholars were compelled to write, "Had Nur al-Din lived then it would be fair to say that Saladin would have been relegated to a footnote in history." 72 Following Nūr al-Dīn's death, Syria fell into a state of disarray; Franks, steeped in the politics of Syria, immediately captured some territories. Hence, for Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn to launch a massive campaign on both fronts -Syria and Egypt -against the Franks, it was necessary to put down the weak Muslim rulers who had surfaced to try to take power in Syria. It was also necessary to stop the Franks to protect Syria from falling into the hands of the Crusaders. Hence, he remained busy fighting fellow Muslims, though incessant wars against the Franks had to continue in order to keep them from taking further Muslim territories in Syria and Egypt. From 1171-1186, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn employed a number of military and political measures to achieve his goal. As stated earlier, he restored the ʿAbbāsid Caliph's authority, 70 Dajani-Shakeel, "Perceptions of the Counter-Crusade," 58. Gibb, Life of Saladin, 8; Azzām, Saladin, 122. 72 Azzām, Saladin, 101; the main issue at stake was what to do about Egypt. As mentioned, Egypt was seen as important from a political and economic perspective. Nūr al-Dīn had made Damascus the center for his jihād campaign, but Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn wanted to use the resources from Egypt for jihād; their strategies might have been different, but the goal was same-conquering the occupied land of the Franks, especially Jerusalem; on this, see also, for example, Nicolle, Saladin, 13. reestablished Sunnī prayers in Cairo, fortified the Egyptian frontier with the Franks, and connected Syria with Egypt thereby making the route safe for Muslim trade and the pilgrimage to Mecca that Franks often attempted to disrupt. 73 However, Western historians argue that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's quest for Jerusalem only emerged when, quoting his biographer Ibn Shaddād, he received a vision following his recovery from illness just two months before his conquest of Jerusalem. Prior to that, his purpose, they argue, was to seize control of as much of Nūr al-Dīn's territories as possible. 74 This underestimates Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's long years of religious zeal in propagating jihād and reuniting the embattled lands and people, part of which was the important recovery of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Dajani-Shakeel also disagrees with this argument, terming it "a misreading of history." She clarifies and adds that "Interruptions in Salāḥ al-Dīn's progress towards achieving this goal [of capturing Jerusalem]" have led some historians "to minimize his quest for the recovery of the city." 75 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's dedication to jihād can be judged from the following statement made soon after he established Sunnī authority in Egypt. Following Islamic principles, he led a number of attacks against the Franks and stated:
If the means for the recovery of Jerusalem are obstructed, and if the will of the Muslims for uprooting the kufr is not sheathed, then the roots of kufr will expand; its (the kufr) menace to the Muslims will increase, and we (the Muslims and their leaders) will be held responsible before God (for failing to check its expansion), and those who fail (to carry on the jihād) are sinful. 76 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn remained continuously committed to his jihād passion and harassed the Crusader enemies all along. He is reported to have said:
We focused on raiding the territories of the infidels (al-kuffar). Thus, not one year passed without our conducting a raid (against the Crusaders), by land or sea...until we have afflicted them with killing, capture and enslavement. We recovered some strongholds, which the people of Islam (the Muslims) have hardly frequented, ever since they were usurped from them.... Among these is a fortress in Aiyla, which the enemy had built in the Sea of India (reference to the Gulf of ʿAqaba at the Red Sea), and which leads to the two holy Muslim shrines (in Mecca and Medina), as well as to Although it appears that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's course of actions were incoherent and lacked a specific goal, an astute observer will appreciate that his strategies followed one another in a systematic and coherent way. Shakeel has broadly classified Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's actions towards the recovery of Jerusalem: "the military, the demographic, and the ideological." 78 One can easily detect that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn envisioned a unified front comprising Egypt, Syria, Yemen, the Jazīra (Mesopotamia), and North Africa under his leadership to increase his manpower and, moved by jihād enthusiasm, to prepare for the recovery of Jerusalem.
He pursued a two-pronged policy of seeking to subvert Nūr al-Dīn's dominions to subdue them after his death and of prosecuting the holy war against the Franks. He, like other rulers, also made alliances with the Franks to help accomplish his long-term policies. Eventually, in 1174, he took Damascus; in 1183, Aleppo; and in 1186, Mosul. In the following year, he launched a decisive attack and defeated the Franks at the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn in July 1187, which paved the way for the easy conquest of Jerusalem and thus brought an end to the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in October 1187, after ninety years of Christian occupation. 79 Then I shall tell you ... of the great courtesy which Saladin showed to the wives and daughters of knights, who had fled to Jerusalem when their lords were killed or made prisoners in battle ... they assembled and went before Saladin crying mercy ... When Saladin saw them weeping, he had great compassion for them, and wept himself for pity ... And he gave them so much that they gave praise to God and publish abroad the kindness and honour which Saladin had done to them. 84 In all, Gibb attributes Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's successes not so much to his impressive personal military virtues, but instead states that his victories were due to his "possession of moral qualities which have little in common with those of a great general." 85 Kingdom of Jerusalem, 230. Ibid., 232-233. 85 Gibb, Life of Saladin, 57.
Diplomatic Relations
Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's conquest of Jerusalem led Europe to launch one of its greatest Crusades, headed by three influential kings of Germany, France, and England. Richard the Lion-Heart, however, became particularly famous for his exceptional military and diplomatic skills that he ruthlessly exhibited during the crusade. There were many confrontations, directly or indirectly, between Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Richard, with the latter trying hard, but in vain, to recover the lost territories. The wave of conquests had thus reversed its course of action. The Muslim religious and ruling classes were now mobilized and unified with great religious zeal to thwart any onslaught from the Franks.
The Muslim response to the Third Crusade was also characterized by "diplomacy, negotiations, and flexibility." 86 Despite the West's continued attempts to regain what it had lost, the Third Crusade, in the words of Dajani-Shakeel, "remained confined militarily and geographically." 87 Muslims successfully arrested the further advance of the Franks into their lands and continuously kept them in check. Eventually, to establish peace just a year before his death in 1193, 88 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn made a truce with Richard that allowed the Crusaders to retain the coastal line along the Mediterranean, and thus, once and for all, the Crusaders abandoned their quest for Jerusalem. 89 Enacting truces and entering into alliances with the Franks were indispensable and a common feature of most of Muslim rulers, including Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. The politics of alliances and truces had a conspicuous impact on the social and economic lives of the Muslims and Western Christians; intercultural exchanges and social relations developed that remained a somewhat ignored subject of the Crusades and should be highlighted and appreciated: Muslims and Franks engaged in cultural, economic and information exchanges. The Franks were one of the main actors in the Levant with whom the Muslims had trade and commercial links despite the 'official' state of war. This trade would increase whenever peace treaties were enacted, particularly after the famous truce agreement between Richard I and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. Diplomatic relations would often foster civilian contacts. This did not mean that such contacts were always genteel, "but it does mean that Frankish-Muslim relations were far richer than the strictly military narrative would allow." 90 The commercial interaction implies cultural interaction, visible in the form of language. Many commercial terms of Arabic origin entered into various Romance languages: words for "custom," such as douane and aduana, all trace their roots to the Arabic dīwān; other examples include the words cheque from sakk (a letter of credit) and tariff from taʿrīf (a notification). 91 Similarly, there was considerable transmission of learning from the Muslims to the Franks. Scientific and religious books were translated from Arabic into Latin, mostly from Spain and Sicily, and these formed the base for later significant developments in European intellectual culture. Muslims in turn also learned some tactics in war technology from the Franks. 92 It is reported that the social interactions between the opposing communities were at the highest level, resulting in the exchange of "physicians, food, gifts and services, as well as the exchange of visits among the commanders." 93 This relationship continued to flourish alongside the 'state of war' under the Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's family, the Ayyūbids (who ruled Egypt to 1250 and Syria to 1260). However, the Mamlūks (slave regiments), who overthrew the Ayyūbids, ultimately destroyed the last Crusader state, Acre, in 1291 and brought an end to Crusader Christian 90 Paul M. Cobb, The Race for Paradise: An Islamic History of the Crusades (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 170.
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Ibid., 172-173. 92 Christie, Muslims and Crusades, 65-67, 73-76. 93 Dajani-Shakeel, "Perceptions of the Counter-Crusade," 66. presence in the Levant. Mamlūks, such as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, regarded the struggle against the invaders as the most pressing form of jihād. 94 Thereby, the Muslim sultans made tangible the dreams of al-Sulamī (who first attempted to mobilize the Muslim rulers with his intellectual capability a century earlier). 95 In this way, al-Sulamī's message of political unity and spiritual purity was translated into a pragmatic reality by practicing the ideal of jihād -a touchstone by which Muslim rulers were judged. 96 Jerusalem, in its way, played an important role in this renewal of jihād thought.
Conclusion
What emerges from the above discussion is that the Muslim response to the Crusades was initially fragmented and disorganized. Muslim intellectuals and religious figures played an important role in expelling the Franks from the Levant. During the course of action, the jihād ideal was aptly exploited to build strong opposition to the enemy. Equally important is the place and role of Jerusalem, which remained a touchstone for any ruler in his jihād campaign against the Crusaders. This study analyzed the two significant aspects of the response in the form of the production of a particular genre of literature and the birth of the Muslim-Christian relationship during the Crusades. The paper supported deeper exploration and analysis of the Muslim, particularly through Muslim sources, in order to uncover many fruitful and constructive medieval aspects, especially intercultural relationships that will help diminish the East-West discontent, distrust, and alienation.
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